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What if all we can see are the parts, and there is not a whole: elements and
manifestations of the making of law of ‘climate justice’
Abstract
This essay discusses the meaning of 'climate justice' and the ways in which it is or is not materialised
currently in climate change litigation. First I present the immateriality of the abstract concepts that make
up this composite term: 'climate' and 'justice'. Yet the placing the words adjacent to one another seems to
mobilise them into a novel composite vehicle of legal action. I trace how the idea of 'climate justice'
hovers as an elusive idea around the concrete particularities of what can be known about 'climate'
specifically in relation to 'justice'. These questions are probed in the setting and context of the Philippine
Human Rights Commission's 2018 Inquiry into the Carbon Majors' (Chevron, Exxon, Shell, BP etc.)
violation of human rights.
The aim here is mainly diagnostic: rather than taking legal doctrines of environmental or international
human rights law as analytical materials, I use a legal materialist approach in order to try to make sense
of what is concretely happening when an issue of a planetary scale of complexity is addressed and
represented in a medium-sized moot court room. It helps to bring into vision the specific modes by which
formats, places and media are enlisted as constitutive elements in the becoming and stabilisation of the
emerging legal matter of climate justice. My analysis depicts law acting as the medium for upscaling (an
idea of human justice) and downscaling (of climate science) different knowledges into other frameworks
of reality than their original ones: to that of the human narrative scale.

This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol23/iss1/10

What if all we can see are the parts,
and there is not a whole: elements
and manifestations of the making
of law of ‘climate justice’
Hyo Yoon Kang
That justice exceeds law and calculation, that the unpresentable exceeds
the determinable cannot and should not serve as an alibi for staying
out of juridico-political battles... Left to itself, the incalculable and
giving (donatrice) idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even
to the worst for it can always be reappropriated by the most perverse
calculation... And so incalculable justice requires us to calculate.
Derrida (1990: 971)

My matter of concern is ‘climate justice’.

On 6 and 7 November 2018 I attended the London segment of
a series of landmark ‘climate justice’ hearings that took place in the
Moot Court Room of the London School of Economics (LSE). It was
part of the Philippine Human Rights Commission’s Inquiry (“Carbon
Major Inquiry”) into claims of human rights violations attributed
to - or caused by - so-called Carbon Major companies (Chevron,
ExxonMobil, BP, Shell and others). The Inquiry was initiated in 2015
by individual Philippine citizens and civil rights organisations with
the help of Greenpeace. The hearings took place in Manila, at the
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Columbia University in New York and at the LSE between March
and December 2018. They were livestreamed, video-recorded and
transcribed. These media are freely available on the Human Rights
Commission’s website (https://essc.org.ph/content/nicc/).

The Inquiry resembled a tribunal in its format than an adjudication
or litigation. Legally speaking, there was no dispute between parties,
but a petition was taken up. The Inquiry was also unusual in the sense
that the Commission has no jurisdiction in the countries where the
Carbon Majors are incorporated, and this might have been reflected in
the particular way it was conducted. The findings of the Inquiry are not
legally binding, but the Commission hopes that they will contribute to
the building of an emerging domestic and international jurisprudence
of ‘climate justice’.

This essay is an attempt to understand how a complex matter of a
planetary scale would be materialised into a ‘legal’ matter in a hearing
in a moot court room (is it ‘moot’? is it ‘law’?) in central London: how do
you put and relate a planet, wind and precipitation of “super-typhoons”
in the Philippines, rain-drenched shivering children, floating corpses,
mud, hunger, thirst, lack of sanitation, computer datasets, digital
algorithms, scientists, ethicists, pension actuaries, lawyers, youtube
livestream, court file numbers, in a medium-sized room over a period
of two days? Initial conjectures to this question might be: ‘language’
or ‘discourse’ employed in ‘legal fiction’, or ways of representing the
‘world’ within the legal language and performance of human rights.
In Latourian terms, we could say that these disparate elements were
associated into a chain of reference so to relate to one another (Latour
1984). Yet, at the moment, there seems to be more unstable relations
and materials at play than a human-linguistic, metaphorical or actornetwork post-facto analysis could intimate. This is because justice and
climate are both abstract concepts. The meaning of their composite,
‘climate justice’, is not clear. If the ‘parts’ (justice, climate) are moving
and unstable concepts, how does law figure them ‘whole’ (climate
justice)? Identifying the constitutive elements of an emerging legal
matter is one issue, but the more difficult task is to diagnose the nature

139

Hyo Yoon Kang

or dynamics of relations between the elements themselves. This entails
delineating relations between three issues, which involve questions of
scale, perspective and knowledge:

First, if the court room and us are part of the planet, how exactly
does the legal performance bring the ‘whole’ of which we are also
part into our partial reality?1 This is a question about my point of
observation amidst different scales and about the ways in which I
collate and assemble different parts despite a missing overall whole
picture. The same question also applies to the Philippine Human Rights
Commission: is it aware of its relative position within the planetary
scale, both physically and in terms of its legal power? I show that the
Commission sought to reflect as messily as possible the multiple and
fractured realities and its own relations and situatedness within the
legal and planetary spaces by carefully choosing certain places, media
and format for the hearings. It did not posit an overarching perspective
(for example, a trans-generational or trans-species justice or ideas of
responsibility (Shue 2018)) or causal equivalence between different
kinds of worlds: human experiential, legal and scientific.
Second, ‘climate justice’ is an emerging legal principle and concern,
which is increasingly associated with a human rights-focused litigation
strategy. It does not yet have a stable legal reality, but the idea is invoked
and enacted with a view from what it ought to ‘be’ and from decidedly
human perspective and scale. In light of the matter of ‘climate justice’
not being fully formed, I approach the Carbon Majors Inquiry from a
legal materialist angle. This is helpful for putting together a detailed
picture of how an abstract, vast, planetary matter of concern may
become materialised as a legal matter of concern. It shows how legal
materials, such as trial locations, settings, order of witness testimonies,
mobilise in a miniature-scale something so big in scale that would
normally be numbing and immobilising. I hope to bring into vision a
more granular understanding of how law is made, particularly at times
when its matters and materials are novel or in a flux.
Third, legal determination of climate justice depends on establishing
causality between the quantitative models of greenhouse gas emissions
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and the qualitative determination of legality: how exactly are the
calculated attributions of historical greenhouse emissions related to a
legal attribution of human rights violation? How does law ‘calculate’
them in order to achieve ‘climate justice’, although justice is incalculable
as Derrida had pointed out (opening quote)? These questions concern
shifts between multiple scales and viewpoints in legal modes of
knowing. I examine what counts as legally material knowledge in
the unusual framework of the Carbon Majors Inquiry and consider
whether the international human rights law framework is suited to
grasp and adequately represent the different concerns that converge in
and simultaneously exceed human language and cognition.

The aim of this essay is diagnostic. It observes and describes the
three above sketched issues within a specific setting in which ‘climate
justice’ has been invoked. The genre is an essay; it tries to make sense
of what is happening in the current torrent of events by taking a step
back from the growing association of the meaning of ‘climate justice’
with international human rights and development. In the first two
sections, I discuss the elusive value of ‘justice’ and then the abstract
scientific concept of ‘climate’. Yet the placing these two abstract ideas
adjacent to one another, a literal spatial and temporal juxtaposition,
seems to mobilise them into a novel composite vehicle of legal action.
In the third section, I describe the emergent materialisation of ‘climate
justice’ in the Philippine Carbon Major Inquiry’s London hearings.
Less focused on the Inquiry’s findings, I am more interested in the
material techniques and formats by which a legal matter of ‘climate
justice’ becomes established: the unusual set-up of the mediatised
hearings and the juxtaposition of numerical and visual representations
of climate with personal narratives of climate change by victims of
super-typhoons.
This essay eschews a doctrinal analysis of environmental or
international human rights law, or of multi-level jurisdictional issues.
This is because I can neither identify a sufficiently delineated object
of inquiry (‘climate justice’ - although it is very much desired and its
lack is felt) nor an existing method (legal doctrines were emerging
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rather than already there). Instead of assuming ‘climate justice’ as a
premise or as an activist strategy, I hope to get a better sense of its
present reality at the end of the analysis. I trace its current form and
substance by attending to the specific modes by which words, utterances
and objects act as constitutive materials for this emerging legal matter
(see introduction to this issue; Kang 2018; Kang & Kendall 2019). A
legal materialist focus might better bring into vision the complex and
contradictory particularities of our present moment than a doctrinal
top-down analysis or a policy-driven bottom-up ‘recipe’.
1 Looking for justice
Derrida wrote that justice is unrepresentable, incalculable, excessive,
donatrice, a gift (1990). Perhaps it was precisely the absence of justice
related to matters of climate that mobilised ‘climate justice’ as a
composite claim. I understand the claim’s strategic utility to consist in
being able to hold at least someone or something (a legally incorporated
persona, such as a corporation or government) legally attributable now
for the climate crisis, which has however had and will continue to have
a longue durée of past, present and future.
In a moral, philosophical sense, climate justice does not have a
stable meaning. Although justice is what most people will seek and
equate with the legal system, when they bring a claim, and identify it
as the purpose of law, it is elusive even in what seems most satisfying
adjudicatory outcomes, which deliver some kind of recognition of pain,
guilt, punishment, perhaps even restoration and remedy. But more often
than not, law fails expectations of righteousness and moral certainty
in adjudication; what seems justified for one party will not be so for
the other. Otherwise they would not be in dispute. Most legal scholars
and lawyers do not assume an overlap between law and moral justice,
nor do they expect law to equate to or deliver ‘justice’. This is often
perceived as a gap between what is desired and what is achieved, and
that is what makes law so disappointing and infuriating. I have yet to
come across a law school module entitled ‘Justice’; in political theory
and ethics, there are many. In law, both in word and practice, justice
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is often framed as a question of fairness of procedure, reconstruction
of events, evidentiary status, admissibility and judicial interpretation
in inquisitorial civil law settings or weighing of arguments presented
by the parties in light of statute and precedents in more adversarial
common law traditions. A legal decision comes about as a result of the
more convincing legal interpretation formed into a better argument.
The scale of justice does not weigh the just against the unjust, but
on the one side, there is the weight of arguments and, on the other,
the counter-arguments.2 Whatever remains of justice is procedurally
performed and bound in which the ‘whole’ picture is elusive.

Justice is not a legal doctrine or principle. It is - to use Latour’s
terminology - not a legal matter of concern. This sounds harsh, but this
is not to say that it does not exist in different forms or manifestations
of legal matters. It hovers as a real spectre around ‘law’, but is not
part or inside of it. As Derrida wrote, “one cannot speak directly about
justice, thematize or objectivize justice, say “this is just” and even less
“I am just,” without immediately betraying justice, if not law (droit).”
(1990: 935) What most legal theorists and scholars would agree on
is that law has a specific ‘internal’ language and rules of the game
which need to be mastered to understand it (Hart’s internal point of
view or Wittgenstein’s language game) and that it relies on specific
institutionalised media and a tradition of material techniques to
perform its legality. Yet law’s origins and practical effects are ‘external’
because they depend on a group’s agreement about a legitimate recourse
to sanction. Such an understanding of law as an effect or force can be
found in Benjamin’s understanding of Gewalt, which denotes latent
power or ‘force’. Gewalt was translated and connoted misleadingly as
violence into French and English (Derrida 1990: 927).3

Differently for Derrida, legal force is not a sovereign-juridical
violence, but a différance of force, as he emphasised “also and
especially of all the paradoxical situations in which the greatest
force and the greatest weakness strangely enough exchange places.
And that is the whole history.” (1990: 929) Legal force is not always
physical enforcement and violence. Conversely, violence could also
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be understood as the effect of the non-event of expected legal ‘force’:
increased pressure to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and
out-of-court settlements, lack of enforcement of alimony payments,
defendants with no legal representation because of lack of legal aid,
etc. Moyn has criticised the hope placed in (human rights) law and
pointed to their adverse effects (2018) that are akin to a joke of “cruel
optimism”, to paraphrase Lauren Berlant’s term. I would argue that it
is equally possible to understand law or ‘legal force’ as a cruel pessimism,
in which the default is an expected absence of any legal force, not to
mention its elusive Other, justice.4 Such cruel pessimism is abound in
domestic jurisdictions, but is particularly acute in international legal
fields whose teeth depend on the interstice of the politically possible.
Justice is what law cannot know and yet seeks as its unrepresentable
essence. This raises the question why justice is still expected to be
achieved through legal means and whether human justice could
ever, even remotely, claim ‘climate’ justice, particularly when the
meaning of ‘climate’ itself is abstract. Matters - issues - don’t speak
by themselves without rhetorical, spatial and temporal frameworks.
This is why the set of techniques and mediations through which they
become material need to be examined. Thinking about what is ‘legal’
about legal materiality, I argued against a simplistic understanding of
materiality as physicality (2018): certain materials (physical objects,
images, practices, techniques) become enlisted by legal reasoning and
give body to legal matters (matters of concern) in law, but the processes
by which they become meaningful to law is not self-evident and needs
to be explained. This implies that the idea of ‘climate justice’ may be
located in the gap between legal matters (in this context, international
human right principles) and the reality of its enactment through specific
materials and their effects (the constitutive elements of the legal Inquiry
and their lack of enforcement power).
2 Looking for climate
The other element in the composite of ‘climate justice’ is ‘climate’.
The concept of ‘climate’ is an unruly composition, which is often only
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manifested and becomes visible as a consequence of anomalies, for
example, the effects of changing climate on biopolitics of population
health and migration, geopolitical calculations on water, securement
of food supplies. Climate is not a representation of a singular process.
It is also not a linguistic representation of a weather event, measured
by temperature or precipitation. Its material reality rather consists of
a composition of historical extrapolations, measurements, past and
projected data, mathematical calculations of averages and means,
and computer algorithms. It is a deeply temporal, yet also abstract
composite concept.
In the scientific sense of the term, climate is an artefact of
measurement and calculation of means. The World Meteorology
Organisation defines climate as “the measurement of the mean
and variability of relevant quantities of certain variables (such as
temperature, precipitation or wind) over a period of time, ranging
from months to thousands or millions of years.” The average period to
determine what is ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ climate is 30 years. Climate
in a wider sense is also “the state, including a statistical description, of
the climate system” which consists of five components: the atmosphere,
hydrosphere, cryosphere, land surface and the biosphere also known
as the ecosphere or the environment. Gabriele Gramelsberger, a
philosopher of science, points out that the notion of climate involves
both a scaling-up of historical, local and singular data that are taken as
proxies and extrapolated into uniform data and datasets (2017). These,
in turn, are modelled with algorithms to make an assumption of a
‘climate balance’ as the zero-line ‘normal’ base case from an average of
the past ten thousand years. The deviations from such a statistical mean
value is then interpreted as climate change. Such a scientific concept
of ‘climate’ is then a mediated and performative category that has
undergone multiple layers of transpositions. It incorporates historical
information, data, formats multiple singular data into uniformity, and
renders them suitable for predictive modelling and simulations.
Change of climate refers to a statistically significant variation in
either the mean state of the climate or in its variability, persisting for
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an extended period (typically decades or longer). ‘Climate change’, in
this sense, depends on a statistical calculation of norm and deviation;
in other words, it is an anomaly based on a broader temporal statistical
framework of ‘climate’ that mixes factual and extrapolated data
(Edwards, 2010). From the 1970s onwards, the noun ‘climate change’
however “became ‘an issue’ rather than the technical description
of changing weather as it had been for the World Metereological
Organisation in 1966.” (Hulme 2014: 1).

The qualification of what constitutes ‘normal’ degree of harmful
weather - abnormal harm - as opposed to climate change-induced
anomalous degree of harm is often ascertained by recourse to scientific
papers and quantitative calculations of past observable data. At the
Carbon Majors hearings in London in November 2018, Myles Allen,
one of the co-authors of the International Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC)’s special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C
above pre-industrial levels, referred to a scientific paper by Takayabu
and others (2015) that argued that the unprecedented intensity of
storms can be traced back to human influences that led to an average
of higher probability of increased wind level. Typhoon Haiyan that
devastated the Philippines in 2013 was the strongest tropical cyclones
ever recorded surpassing existing typhoon classification. The highest
level until Haiyan was category 3. A new category of level 5 “super
typhoon” had to be invented after Haiyan. It caused approximately
6201 deaths, more than 27000 injuries and the displacement of nearly
four million people. But it is not only the singular catastrophic typhoon
that is beyond the abnormal level of harm. The frequency of harmful
weather also results in an accumulated effect of anomalous level of
harm. Philippines suffers from more than twenty storms a year on
average.
Philippine is one of the countries assessed as being one of the most
vulnerable to the effects of climate change to which it hardly contributed
(Pretis 2018). Most countries who already do or will suffer from climate
change are the ones which did not contribute to the accumulated and
now exponential effects of human-caused climate change. Yet the actors
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and factors that caused those highly localised sufferings are not here
or there in the sense of law. They no longer exist or are already dead:
historical emitters, such as British coal-fuelled factories, or companies
that have changed their corporate identities in their imperial histories,
such as Burmah Oil that became Anglo-Persian Oil Company and
later, BP (Mitchell 2011: 43-65). Or they are not ‘legal persons’ in the
jurisdictions in which they can be addressed and held accountable for
the consequences of their action (for example, global shipping systems,
elements of which operate under multiple jurisdictions). Historically
most of the emission of greenhouse gases stems from the US (Malm
2016). Global level of CO2 emission at 2018 was at a record.
The materiality of ‘climate’ in the narrow meaning of the term is an
organic and inorganic composite of organisms, tangible and intangible
knowledge systems and histories, which comprise a vast number of
disparate elements that constitute the concept of ‘climate’,: gases, earth,
plants, living organisms human and non-human, numbers, words, rock
samples, photographs, computer algorithms for calculating means,
simulations based on algorithmic models of future trends based on past
data, scientists, international institutions, such as International Energy
Agency, IPCC, parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change, non-governmental organisations, working groups, emails,
letters, meetings, protesters, networks on social media, plaintiffs,
lawyers, judges, school pupils walking out, and so on. It is difficult to
think of anything which would not qualify as being part of ‘climate’.

The concept of climate links particular and sensed experiences
that cannot be ordinarily related to one another into an overarching
explanatory framework and relations of causality and probability. At
the same time, by creating an aggregated scientific representation and
modelling of particular and fractured realities of historical and local
observations, climate sciences eclipse the specific, concrete, particulars
into an abstract scientific model and re-imagines them as future
fractured realities through localised predictions of climate change
impact. Science thus turns invisible the particular manifestations and
experiences, but makes visible the overall explanatory framework. Our
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knowledge of climate and climate change “is a knowledge that can only
be created via a techno-scientific apparatus so extensive that it is now
an entire planetary infrastructure” (Wark 2015: 180). The scientific
mode of knowledge shifts, reverses and invents different perspectives
of our ability to ‘see’ and make sense of climate. Although such a
scaling-up of vision entails all the problems associated with abstraction
and its violence (Weizmann and Sheikh 2015), it also mobilises novel
associations, such as the emerging legal practice of ‘climate justice’.
3 Materialising the matter of climate justice: juxtaposing
rather than translating
The law of ‘climate justice’ is in the early stages of its formation
(Jafry 2018; Klinsky and Brankovic 2018; Robinson 2018), although
there is no shortage of academic work written on the ethics and political
theory of climate change, referred to broadly as ‘climate justice’ (Shue
2018; Gardiner 2011; Vanderheiden 2008). Different legal subfields
can be mobilised to articulate what is just or unjust in light of the
effects of climate change: tort, environmental, international, property,
intellectual property, medical, company laws (see Setzer & Vanhala
for an overview of litigation relating to climate change, 2019); but
increasingly the term ‘climate justice’ has become closely associated
with an invocation of international law of human rights together the
aim of ‘development’ (UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and
human rights 2019). It embodies the premises that justice is a human
matter and that human suffering ought to be remedied in order to
benefit politically underrepresented people.
Despite, or precisely because of, its avowed link to the legalistic
and universalistic vision of human rights, climate justice may perhaps
never stabilise into a coherent and overarching set of legal matters, that
is to say, doctrines or principles, paradoxically because of its planetary
scale of the problem, which needs to be scaled down to a much smaller
scale of cause and effect relations that is recognisable to legal modes
of reasoning. So far legal claims for climate justice have been marked
by a remarkable fragmentation of non-binding, binding and yet not
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enforceable, domestic and international legal obligations, agreements
and laws.5 Yet in order for the scholar to observe how climate justice
is increasingly figured as a legal matter, examining its materiality can
help to break the complex matter down to its appearances, partial
manifestations, experiences and materials: the text of the petition by
the room of a ‘climate justice’ landmark hearing, the testimonies and
expressions of panelists, witnesses, audiences, powerpoint slides and
the position and movement of the video camera. It is in this sense
that a draft text for the Paris Agreement can be the battle site against
manifestations of injustice propelled by climate change, which the
South African negotiator, Nozipho Mxakato-Diseko, had described as
a “recipe for apartheid” (Malm 2015). The constitutive materials and
media in the making of law shape the composition of a legal matter.
They enable the idea of ‘climate justice’ to attain legal reality.

It is taken for granted but really rather odd, that legal internal
processes and formats remain relatively constant in institutions and
across various jurisdictions, despite the plethora and scales of different
issues brought to adjudication, inquiry or legislative deliberation. The
phenomena that are associated with climate change are unprecedented,
but these events are brought to the courts or tribunals that might
employ the same legal formats of giving evidence or resort to the
same doctrines, rules and processes that might be used in the context
of, for example, property disputes about trees causing subsidence and
harming the value of your neighbour’s property. This was the case in
Lliuya v RWE (2015, currently ongoing in Oberlandesgericht Hamm,
Germany, concerning Lliuya’s claim for damages from the German
utility company, RWE, for its proportional contribution to global
warming that is claimed to have caused the melting of glacier damaging
his property in Peru).6

This is particularly strange considering that all of the manifestations
of climate change operate on different scales of knowledge and
perspectival origins: weather is a singular temporal and spatial
observation, it is perceived and felt by humans, whereas climate is a
mathematical notion in reference to a broader temporal and spatial
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framework. Climate denotes an absolute mean value, that is, a
mathematical calculation that cannot be experienced. For example, in
relation to the Watt-Cloutier petition seeking relief from violations
resulting from global warming caused by acts and emissions of the
United States and submitted to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, the Commission declared the petition inadmissible
since “the information provided does not enable us to determine
whether the alleged facts would tend to characterise a violation of
rights protected by the American Declaration”.7 In other words, the
Commission declared that human observations of changing weather
and its effects, i.e. the “alleged facts”, could neither be linked to the
legal conception of human rights nor to the science of climate change.
The elements of a narrative were there, but they could not be linked into
one another to form a more stable whole. They were not meaningful as
legal materials. The questions at stake are which kind of experience are
seen and can be made more legally material and how these different
knowledges and claims can be juxtaposed so to give substance to a legal
matter of concern. How did the Philippine Human Rights Commission
approach the legal matter of climate justice and attempt to give legal
shape to a plethora of phenomena that were both experienced and
numerically calculated?
Commissioner Roberto Eugenio Cadiz, the presiding chair of the
Commission, describes climate justice as an emerging idealistic and
creative strategy of human rights law rather than reflecting an existing
legal reality:
The challenge to national human rights institutions is to test
boundaries and create new paths, to be bold and creative instead of
timid and docile, to be more idealistic and less pragmatic, to promote
soft laws into becoming hard laws, to be able to see beyond legal
technicalities and establish guiding principles that can later become
binding treaties - in sum, to set the bar of human rights to a higher
standard. (https://essc.org.ph/content/nicc/).

A number of such creative litigation related to climate justice is
ongoing in multiple jurisdictions at the time of writing.8 In London,
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Commissioner Cadiz straddled a fine balance between performing
a recognisable legality, on the one hand, and on the other hand,
stabilising a novel legal matter of concern by multiple associations: from
historical greenhouse gas emissions to climate change, and from the
unprecedented intensity of past typhoons in the Philippines to human
rights violations. The Inquiry explored the nature of these connections
and their limits.

The spatial-temporal process of this Inquiry was unusual by being
multi-sited and virtual. Commissioner Cadiz emphasised at the start
of the London hearings that the aim of the Inquiry was to initiate a
global dialogue around climate change. The hearings were held in three
cities: Manila, the seat of the Commission and its place of jurisdiction,
as well as the global centres of New York and London where it had
no jurisdiction. The hearings were accessible to members of the public
and the press. They were also livestreamed. A professional camera
man recorded the hearings, whilst simultaneously keeping an eye on
the livestream youtube page. The decision to have multiple sites for
the hearing was peculiar, but apt: none of the major carbon producing
companies are headquartered in the Philippines or are Philippine legal
entities, they are mainly American or European ones. Dr Joana Setzer
of the Grantham Institute for Climate Change at the LSE explained
to me that “Commissioner Cadiz wanted this to be a global issue.
He wanted to initiate a global dialogue rather than an adversarial
confrontation.” The petitioners’ website also states that “the process
would be a dialogue and not an investigation to determine guilt or
innocence.” (ESSC, National Inquiry on Climate Change). Nongovernmental organisations, such as Greenpeace, the Sabin Center for
Climate Change at Columbia University and the Grantham Institute
assisted the Commission in the set-up of the hearings.

Cornelia Vismann had insightfully analysed differences between
hearings, trials and television tribunals (2003). I wondered what she
would have thought of this special multi-location, multi-media, globally
networked legal event. In the London hearings, the hard-working
camera man consulted with Dr Setzer at the beginning of the first day;
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moved back and forth between the camera which was placed next to
the desk for the invited testimonies and the computer at the back of
the room that was connected to the powerpoint screen; established the
skype connection and checked for volume. From the outset, the hearing
was to be livestreamed, recorded and uploaded to the www. It is in this
sense that the hearings instantaneously formed a digital ‘archive’ with
the ability to be immediately retrieved and circulated. The video
recordings and their online presence were perhaps even more significant
than the physical locations. The digital availability and circulation of
the recording amplifies and accelerates the hearing’s status as an
emergent (legal) matter considerably than the mere act of recording
and inscribing a legal hearing in cellulose or silico. These digital
mediations did not only reflect the global issue of climate justice that
exceeded a single physical location, but it also strangely fit the plasticity
and abstractness of both concepts of climate and justice. The online
presence of the hearings gave shape to the composite term ‘climate
justice’.
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Whereas the international mobilisation of NGOs, witnesses and
experts reflected the multi-spatial nature of climate justice as an issue,
the digital presence and multi-site format were certainly also creative
solutions to the discrepancy between the occasion’s momentous legal
creative significance to build a necessarily international jurisprudence
of ‘climate justice’ and the Commission’s inability to enforce or award
damages, because the formal format was that of an inquiry rather
than one of litigation or adjudication. Although Dr Setzer introduced
the Inquiry by embedding its importance in temporal terms as
having an “impact on the past, present and the future”, some carbon
major companies had disputed the Commission’s jurisdiction on the
ground of the principle of territoriality. None of the carbon major
corporations whose responsibilities were investigated were present
at the hearings. The ethicist, Henry Shue, who testified via skype
from Oxford, observed: “I think it is disrespectful not to respond.
It does not take the Commission seriously and that is insulting to
the Commission.” (my transcript) At the beginning of the first day
of the hearings, Commissioner Cadiz recognised the legal norm of
territorial jurisdiction and stated: “We respect the principle of territorial
jurisdiction”. Yet the legal status of the Inquiry remained a fluid one;
at one point, Commissioner Cadiz corrected himself when he said “in
this court” to “in this room”.
The London hearings took place in the medium-sized moot court
room of the LSE Law Department. The room had been rearranged
from its normal circular setting into a frontal one resembling a court.
The Commissioners were seated slightly higher in a row facing the
audience. The clerks sat to their right. Legal officials entered the room
from a different door than the audience. The lawyers of the petitioners
sat at a desk separated from the row of audience members. The witnesses
and expert were summoned to a desk that was positioned between the
audience and the Commission. It resembled the layout of a court room.
Yet there were bits that gave inklings of this extraordinary yet somehow
also strangely familiar mis-en-scène that distinguished it from a court of
law. The overall atmosphere was one of a large gathering of people that
already seemed to know each other from previous encounters. During
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breaks people were introduced to one another, and the atmosphere
was friendly. The two-days of hearing were organised as sequences
of a mixture of invited witness and expert statements. Testimonies
were invited rather than summoned. The statements and the format
in which the experts presented resembled the academic conference
with powerpoint presentations than a legal proceeding. Shue’s skype
testimony was projected on a large screen. Presiding Commissioner
Cadiz invited comments and questions from the audience after each
testimony.
The heterogeneous assembly in the moot court room - composed
of people who lost their homes several times due to typhoons, human
rights commissioners, their clerks and lawyers, fresh-faced young
lawyers from Baker MacKenzie and Linklaters in the audience
probably taking notes on behalf of their Carbon Major corporate
clients, Greenpeace lawyers and activists seated next to them, expert
and witness testifying over two days, and observers like me - made
me think of the heterogeneous elements which materialise ‘law’: the
distributed location of the hearings; media technologies of bringing
the matter together; issues of law’s mobility, mobilisation of networks;
the discursive construction of legal matters, which have the ability to
materialise something which is not visible, such as global warming; the
difficulty of establishing a legal matter despite real, physical, material
harm as told in the powerful testimonies of typhoon survivors. There
were also simultaneous fluidity and yet hedging disclaimer brackets
between disciplinary expertise.

My initial interest in the hearings had focused on the ways in which
the Inquiry would transform scientific attribution principles and risks
into legal responsibility and liability by reference to the fast-developing
area of so-called attribution science, which calculates and attributes
a defined quantity of greenhouse emissions to individual companies
or countries. Richard Heede’s 2014 report on Carbon Majors formed
the central scientific foundation for the legal inquiry. It broke down
the emissions to the largest carbon producing companies and states.
The Inquiry’s remit of investigating human rights violations that were
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allegedly caused by Carbon Major companies required a reconstruction
of the linkage between historic greenhouse emissions, their contribution
to climate change, legal obligations and responsibility not to violate
them. In other words, the strength of legal reasoning rested on scaling
down climate change models, linking past emission data based on past
company and meteorological data across different spaces and actors,
breaking down global carbon production over time, to typhoons that
devastated the Philippines and in turn establish relation between all
of the foregoing to human rights violations suffered by the petitioners.

Law, particularly tort law, deals with issues of risks in which
causality between the actions of the defendant and the effects on
the plaintiff is difficult to prove so that a likelihood of harm, a legal
determination, rests on probability calculations (Goldberg 2011). I was
expecting a detailed questioning into the assumptions of Heede’s report
and the attribution sciences, as the scale and complexity of proving
the plausibility soundness of the petitioners’ claims was extraordinary
and would require linking the three scales of the individual, legal and
scientific experiences and modes of reasoning. But climate sciences,
including attribution sciences, were not opened up and left intact as
truth statements. Myles Allen, one of the co-authors of the IPCC
1.5˚c report, had also testified in the City of Oakland vs Carbon Majors
case (case 3:17 cv-06011-WHA-2019) earlier that year. He expressed
his surprise about not having been queried about the soundness of the
climate models in that case:
Commissioner Cadiz “Are you aware if any of the fossil fuel companies
use attribution science to look at their impact?”
Prof Myles Allen: “I am not aware but one interesting case, all on public
record, the companies did not dispute the large-scale warming and
attributable harm. The focus on what was known when. There was
no serious debate about the kind of work I do. I came away a little
disappointed because I was expecting an argument, and there was
none.” (Transcript, London, 7 November 2018)

Perhaps based on previous experiences of giving expert testimony,
Allen’s statement was the only one that attempted to draw a boundary
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between ‘legal’ knowledge and other kinds, although he seemed to have
a distinct sense of what would make a good legal argument or judgment:
“The plaintiffs lost in San Francisco. I commend the judgment to
you, it’s a very intelligent judgment ...as lawyers you should read the
judgment, I am not a lawyer”. Later he reverted to his scientific persona:
“I am only saying as a scientist what would have been technically
possible.” Despite an explicit positioning of his identity as a non-lawyer
but as a climate modelling scientist (“the panel should hear on climate
change experts on the Philippines. I am global climate modeller, it’s
not my brief ”), Allen’s statement was carefully crafted and delineated
a historical relation between carbon emissions, scientific knowledge at
a given point in time, and the carbon majors’ moral responsibility. His
testimony linked the question of available knowledge at a certain time
to questions of responsibility and harm. Allen addressed the question
whether the companies could have foreseen warming and avoided harm.
Referring to the economist, William Nordhaus’ 1977 ‘Strategies for
control of carbon dioxide’ paper (Cowles discussion paper 477, 6 January
1977), Allen contextualised the state of knowledge in 1977, which had
- with hindsight - correctly estimated the change of global temperature
with continued fossil use. He situated the “sciences” by explaining
that Nordhaus’ study was not a “niche science”, but that Nordhaus
was drawing data from mainstream climate science community at
that time. These had not been based on modelled extrapolations, but
on already available data about temperature and fossil expenditure:
“This was not a niche research confined to a particular economist but
this was reasonably established knowledge by the 1980s. The papers
of fuel industry also show that they were well aware of the warming.”
The industry, equipped with the knowledge in the 1980s, could
have prevented the exponential climate change that we are currently
experiencing. Here Allen’s rhetoric resembled legal advocacy than a
disinterested Mertonian scientific expert statement: “The crucial point
is - in my view - and I would like you to consider this - that there was
an alternative course of action to the industry.”
Allen seemed fully prepared to provide justifications for the
methodology of climate change models. He emphasised several times
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that the attribution science findings had been based on historical data
rather than modelled predictions. It seemed to me that he was acutely
aware of the difficulty of establishing substantive legal connection
between past moral responsibility to recent harm. Yet at the same
time, when answering the question whether typhoons, such as the
“super-typhoon” Yolanda, were caused by human factors or not in light
of the findings by climate scientists (Takayabu et al. 2015), he worded
his explanation with extreme care and differentiated between simple
models of causality (Humean billiard game) and probable causality.
It made clear that there was no linear or direct causality at play, but
rather a higher probability of an event:
... the answer is not certain. It’s not a billiard game. It’s a much more
chaotic situation. You can’t say precisely in an individual instance that
an external driver such as large scale warming will influence a chaotic
event such as typhoon... You can’t say that there is higher wind due to
human influence, but [we can say that there is] an average increase,
higher probability of very high wind, with human influence.... it’s not
the warming or human influences have caused the storms but we can see
from the study (it can be recommended as it is a carefully constructed
study) it shows how human influences have increased wind level and
therefore made storms more intense. (my transcript)

I was sitting next to Veronica Cabe who survived a series of
typhoons and also gave a testimony, as Myles Allen was explaining
scientific graphs on the screen. I wondered what she thought of these
visualisations when their experiences of the typhoon were literally
so different from the “carefully constructed study” that was being
explained. In London, two typhoon victims testified: Marielle Bacason
who had survived Typhoon Haiyan and was now a research nurse based
in London and Veronica Cabe who was a community organiser for the
Nuclear Free Bataan Movement and had experienced several typhoons,
the worst of which was typhoon Ketsana. All commissioners listened
intently to their personal accounts of the typhoon, perhaps even more so
than when they were listening to legal and scientific expert statements.
Their faces were fully turned and attentive. Cabe’s statement of what a
typhoon feels like when it occurs rendered on human-scale the reality
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of what climate scientists have called “the increase in intensity of
human-influenced storms”:
the water level was rising up to roof level. I needed to reunite with
my family. The priority was to bring cooked food (they had no food
for 24 hours) and dry clothes because of exposure to cold rain. They
were cleaning already stuck in knee-level mud. Everything was lost:
personal belonging, underwear, toothbrush. I was worried about my
father’s already bad health.
The floods have changed our lives. I felt that parts of our dignity was
lost [voice breaking].
We had to rely on help and donations. I went to relief lines and wait for
hours, half a day for a parcel of relief, not knowing if it would arrive,
line again for another day. Relief goods were thrown at us, neighbours
were fighting each other just to get their share because it was chaotic,
and the government was not ready for the ongoing floods at the time.
We had to borrow money from anyone.
Monsoon rain caused flooding again. We lost everything again.
I knew that typhoon would come again and wreck everything that
we had put up.
When would this situation stop?
When will the process of recovering and rebuilding end?
Until now we yet have to get back our own house.
My mother has psychological issues.
My father before he died asked again and again: [says something in
Filipino]
He was saying “when can we rebuild our house?”
In reality it is not easy because we do not have the money [voice breaks].
Are we going to move again?
[empathetic faces in the commission]
I think this is my reality.
For many Filipinos this is their reality.
There is no choice but to survive the typhoon. Having no water, no
electricity, not knowing that the family is safe.
I ask: do we really have a choice?
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I have been engaged in local community organisation against coal
and nuclear facilities.
I have seen that poor communities have become even more
impoverished.
I believe that our stories and voices can be heard through this petition
I believe that the governments and corporations have the choice to
act differently.
They have the right to do their business but we also have the right to be.
(my transcript)

Although the Inquiry had no binding force, it had a familiar legal
format. The testimonies were ordered, presented and matched with
their administrative filing numbers. Every testimony started after
associating it with the filed documents for the ‘record’:
Comissioner Cadiz: “what are the titles of these documents please?”
Clerk gives the file designation, titles and length of pages (“consisting
of 15 pages”) and adds that these confirmations are “just for the record”.

The individual testimonies were left in their entirety and lightly
questioned for comprehension. During the hearing, the Commission
did not explicitly relate the state of scientific knowledge to a legal finding
of a human rights violation. Myles Allen’s statement attributed the
intensity of storm levels to human influence, but in my understanding,
it appeared just short of establishing an unequivocal causal link between
the responsibility of carbon majors to the human rights violations
suffered by Philippine citizens. The hearing did not attempt to construct
a coherent causal or teleological narrative. Nor did it choreograph or
perform a drama. Rather it resembled a formalised, legally formatted,
dissonant, polyphonic sequence. The order of testimonies seemed
disconnected. The first day proceeded in this order: a UNICEF official,
a UCL environmental scientist, a Church of England ethical pension
fund advisor, followed by the lawyer acting for Lliuya against RWE
etc. It reflected the fragmented totality of climate justice as an idea
that ought to encompass multi-scalar, transdisciplinary, multi-species
perspectives, but which remained bound by pragmatic constraints (who
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would be available when) and traditional legal formats and procedures.
The picture of a ‘whole’ - climate justice - in relation to its situated
parts (testimonies, graphs, powerpoint, skype call, lawyers, cameraman,
academics, files, screens, furniture arrangement) was left to the observer
to piece together. This seemed to me more truthful and reflective of
the current kaleidoscope of conflicting realities than an adversarial
adjudicatory format could achieve.
4 Concretising climate justice by affinitive juxtapositions
I started writing this essay from a perspective of cruel pessimism,
which expects the absence of legal ‘force’, rather than expecting
climate justice designed around human rights to lead us into a cruel
optimism of human rights. Yet these perspectives are perhaps not all
that different from one another. Derrida conceived law, or the meaning
of legal difference, as a permanent radical opening, as “a question of ...
all the paradoxical situations in which the greatest force and greatest
weakness strangely enough exchange places” (1990: 929). I do not
expect the nomenclature and rhetoric of climate justice to reveal or
deliver justice.
However as an ‘internal’ point of view-agnostic-critical legal
scholar, who diagnoses how law works with pessimistic hope, I can
trace and try to explain how the components in the system work and
how to think about and with legal materials when justice is uncertain
and unknown: which jurisdictions were claimed or not, how the claim
was framed, which principle was invoked or not - tort, property or
human rights -, what kind of evidence was oral and/or in the form
of a written submission, which testimonies were invited, whether to
record and livestream the hearings, the depth of financial pocket to
sustain the proceedings... These are the materials and ingredients for
a practical strategy or diagnosis of the necessarily contingent practice
and artifice that is law. It is the specific composition of these elements
and their relations to one another within particular legal rhetorical
and practical framings that I mean when I use the word “concrete”.
To make legality concrete is to identify and observe the different
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elements of the overall practice, how they relate, and what they do
in such a process. I do not know for certain what justice is, and it
is nothing insightful or novel to say that law fails it, but I can try to
analyse and explain the texture of legal composition as it is practiced
and the dynamic of a problematisation. Understanding the “plumbing”
inside-out by diagnosing the particular ways in which the constitutive
materials are linked to form an emergent legal matter could yield a
more specific understanding of the often seemingly inextricable legal
apparatus, abbreviated monolithically as ‘the law’ and the mechanisms
of its stabilisation. This in turn might yield different strategies towards
different ideals of justice; or at least, it might help us to understand
law’s paradoxes and particular failures of justice’s absence.

A contextualised, historically and theoretically informed notion of
legal materiality is well suited to dissect and perceive shifts in scales
and frameworks of reference. In the Carbon Majors Inquiry, ‘climate
justice’ was materialised as a legal matter through specific locations,
media and formats. The practices, utterances, presences, gatherings in
the hearing and their textual and visual recordings were the constitutive
factors for enacting the “matters of concern” of ‘climate’ and ‘justice’
although the whole of ‘climate justice’ was yet undefined and may
remain so. Nonetheless, the mediated aesthetics and spaces of the
inquiry, climate models, speech acts shaped the emergent legal matter
of climate justice despite a lack of jurisdiction.
During the hearing, the Commission evaded the question of
causality. This muteness reflects Lord Hoffmann’s observation that
“causal requirements [in law] are creatures of the law and nothing more”
(2011: 5). Instead of causality, the primary mode of relationality of the
hearing was a different one, something I would characterise as affinitive
juxtaposition. The hearing engendered a spatial and linguistic association
between climate science and human experience by bringing together
abstract scientific and personal knowledges and their different ways of
knowing (by mathematical models and by narratives) into a common
space. The Commission withheld from explicitly drawing relations
between them. It also did not translate the concept of climate into a
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legal idea of justice, nor did it transpose it. Rather here ‘law’ seemed to
act as a distinctive attribute (‘legal’ testimony, ‘legal’ file, ‘legal’ inquiry)
that imbued a shared quality amongst elements that had otherwise
not much in common. The legal inquiry conjoined words, people
and things loosely despite compressing climatic space and historical
times into two days in a medium-sized room. The mere juxtaposition
of diverse knowledges of the same problem (climate change) with its
different phenomena produced associations: greenhouse emissions
became associated with legal responsibility. But beyond this, there
was no co-functioning that is characteristic of an assemblage (Deleuze
& Parnet 2002: 52), no stickiness of knotty entanglements (Haraway
2007: 287) and no entangling patterns of diffraction (Barad 2014).
These may emerge in the future. For now, the only relationality between
the materials was the differentiating practice of the Inquiry itself: the
attribution of certain materials (witnesses, testimonies, presentations,
graphs, numbers, narratives, moot court room...) as ‘legal’. The hearing
invoked affinities between disparate parts through juxtaposition, that
is to say, a literal putting-next-to-one-another.

The hearing in London did not mention or consider earth, or
non-human entities, as legal agents. This is not surprising considering
that the figure of earth is not a central component in both concepts of
climate and justice. Despite Lovelock’s Gaia theory, Latour’s invocation
of ‘earth’ as a political actor (2018) and Povinelli’s conception of
“geontopower” (2018), earth is not (yet) a legal actor. Earth still needs
to be ‘incorporated’ in law. Even if mountains are recognised as legal
personae, they need friends to advocate on their behalf, to paraphrase
Miguel Tamen’s book title, Friends of Interpretable Objects. Earth also
needs friends to speak on its behalf. Yet I wonder whether the resort
to human rights in face of a planetary and multi-species existential
obliteration seems akin to asking nuclear scientists to assert their rights
of nuclear research in light of nuclear warfare. Is the anthropocentric
response to a problem caused by a peculiar kind of anthropocentricism
- disembodied, rationalist and extractive-capitalist-imperialist - an
inimical response to the effects of climate change? Is the human rights
focus of the ‘climate justice’ movement re-enforcing an understanding
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of global warming as a crisis for primarily humans? I remain conflicted
between the conceptual contradiction of invoking the rights of the
species that have caused the issue in the first place and recognising
the need for an efficacious legal pragmatic strategy in order to reduce
carbon emission down to zero. Malm (2018), for example, rejects the
hybridisation of the human/non-human and the nature/culture binaries.
He criticises the Latourian concept of actant and new materialist ideas
of innate non-human agencies as diluting our responsibility to act. It
is, however, not obvious, at all, that anthropocentric human rights law,
or indeed legal avenues, are the right means to the end. Law has so
far been a most impotent mode of human regulation in the face of the
large-scale problem of climate change, which also affects other kinds
of beings than humans.
My discomfort with human rights law as a truthful strategy might
perhaps be alleviated if we diluted the human/non-human dichotomy.
For our human language and discourses are not only our exclusive,
purified domains, even in the realm of legal language which attempts
to distinguish between ‘legal’ codes and materials and non-legal others.
Human language is based on and surrounded by noises, as Lingis writes:
The noise is not analytically decomposable, as communication theory
would have it, into a multiplicity of signals, information-bits, that
are irrelevant or that conflict... The noise figures as resonance and
vocalization that, like the scraping wings of crickets we hear, contains
no message [although crickets communicate in the ultrasonic range,
too high for human ears to hear.] ... For we too communicate what we
communicate with the background noise, and we communicate the
background noise. (1994: 47-8)

The noise surrounding the Carbon Majors Inquiry is arguably even
thicker, mixing the natural with the artificial. Added to the forceful
“vibrancy of the land, the oceans and the skies” which move, rain and
rise up, we also have the effects of oceanic cables, youtube videos,
internet pages, camera angles and skype connections that represent
these natural phenomena in other ways than as “noise”. We have
multiple human actors: victims of typhoons, legal commissioners,

163

Hyo Yoon Kang

migrants, activists, lawyers, scientists, academics and journalists who
share physical and online spaces with varying intensities. They are the
ones which introduce the “noise” of anomalous climate and unattainable
justice into the purified legal music of ‘human rights’ and corporate
personhood. Already the noise might overwhelm any attempts to
distinguishing them from ‘legal’ communication. At the hearing, there
was no communication, but a calm sequence of cacophonic noises.

Kohn’s How Forests Think (2013) employed Charles Peirce’s
understanding of icon and index to make sense of non-human/human
semiotics. The challenge for legal reasoning and imagination consists
in “attending to the ways in which our linguistic, cognitive and bodily
habits exist in relation to the world and emerge as a higher level of
patterning against constraints around us” (Anker 2017: 208). I would
add that such an imagination ought not only entail thinking law
metaphorically in the modes of as or as if (Roger and Maloney 2017).
Analogies and mimesis connect different knowledges via similarity,
but also tend to privilege patterns of what we already know. We ought
to make analogical explorations more careful by paying attention
to particularities, that is to say, incorporate “respect for contextual,
academico-institutional, discursive specificities, mistrust for analogies
and hasty transpositions, for confused homogenizations” (Derrida
1990: 933). Jurisprudential analysis has much to learn from the detailed
studies of non-linguistic representation, visual or modal relationality
and communication found in history of science (Hoffmann 2017),
art theory (Stafford 2001; Weigel 2015) and musicology (Dahlhaus
1968/1990; Pesce 1987), as well as from other kinds of semiologies
and world views (Anker 2017) that can enrich and complicate law’s
dominant tradition of written texts and narratives (Constable 2014).
In law, in light of the finite little living organisms that we humans
are, the scale of our importance is in an inverted and also perverted
relationship to the planet. Such is the construction and practice of legal
materials based on human communication, language, and their media
of representation. In an anti-Copernican mode, in law, the world is
comprehensible only if it revolves around it, and us, humans. In the
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legal hearing, climate and justice are materialised and particularised
into human narrative scale. This occurs by resorting to the universal
principles of human rights. Climate justice advocates in the Philippine
human rights inquiry entrench a clear distinction not only between
human and non-human actions, but also between corporations and
human. They enlist different materials - from climate data, research
papers to eyewitness statements of typhoon Haiyan - to construct a
legal matter from the standpoint of human. It may be a more efficacious
as a strategy than representing or speaking on behalf of, for example,
an ocean or giving legal standing to a river.

Yet there is an undeniable gap between the ideals of universal human
rights and of climate justice. Human rights claims cannot give justice
to ‘climate’. Also it is not clear if ‘justice’ makes sense to earth, fauna,
flora. They may not perceive ‘justice’ as such. Perhaps justice is sought
for ‘non-humans’ in solidarity and with the help of some humans who
are treated as ‘non-humans’ and who are already at the receiving end of
global warming. The legal performance of ‘justice’ through and in its
materials (human rights categories, legal spaces, media technologies,
filings, testimony of claimants, scientists, lawyers, ethicist, video
recordings) may be incomplete and insufficient to represent and address
the totality of climate change. Nonetheless it helps to particularise
and ‘scale down’ a scale that is vast, probabilistic, rhetorically and
technoscientifically mediated. It is our prosthetic ‘sensory apparatus’
of making and knowing climate change on a more human scale.
Although it describes past events and experiences, ‘climate change’ as
a reality denotes a statistical anomaly based on scientific models. These
scientific numbers cannot be experienced in totality. We cannot feel
a calculated probability. Arthur Koestler wrote that “statistics don’t
bleed; it is the details that count. ... We can only focus on little lumps
of reality” (1945: 97). Turning of ‘climate justice’ into a legal matter
is then perhaps the difficult and fraught attempt to form “little lumps
of legal reality” without a claim to representational veracity of the
relationship between nature, earth, non-human and humans. It will
result in representational violence to the majority of (non-human) lives
and organisms, but law’s absence will, too.
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I thank Joana Setzer of the LSE for inviting me to observe the Carbon
Majors Inquiry hearings and Moritz Neugebauer of Kent Law School for
his meticulous research assistance on the emerging body of climate justice
litigation. I am grateful to the article reviewers for their constructive
suggestions, as well as Christoph Hoffmann, Verena Halsmayer, Kris Decker,
Sandra Gratwohl and Kevin Saladin for their helpful comments and invitation
to discuss the text at the academic retreat of the Chair of Science Studies,
University of Lucerne, Switzerland.
1.

Thanks to Henrique Carvalho who pointed out this paradox of doubleidentities, or simultaneous locations, to me so clearly.

2. On the figure of scale as balance and non-existent justice in such a balance,
see Biagioli in Critical Inquiry, 2018.
3.

“I have often called for vigilance, I have asked myself to keep in mind the
risks spread by this word, whether it be the risk of an obscure, substantialist,
occulto-mystic concept or the risk of giving authorization to violent, unjust,
arbitrary force.” (Derrida 1990: 929)

4. The Bhopal industrial disaster on 3 December 1984, was caused by an
intentional non-compliance with Indian chemical safety regulation by
the US-owned Union Carbide. Mieville (2015) recalls: “Between 8,000
and 10,000 people died that night. 25,000 have died since. Half a million
were injured, around 70,000 permanently and hideously. The rate of birth
defects in the area is vastly high. The groundwater still shows toxins
massively above safe levels.” Union Carbide settled out of court; its CEO
was never extradited to India despite an arrest warrant. Union Carbide and
Dow Chemicals, which bought it in 2001, did not respond to Indian court
summonses. In 1991, the Indian Supreme Court accepted a settlement
which had the result of voiding all claims against Union Carbide and
protecting the company from future claims. Would it have been better if
there had been legal ‘violence’ or force, particularly in light of the scale of
the Bhopal catastrophe?
5. The outcome of the appeal of the Urgenda case in the Netherlands
which holds the government accountable for breach of its climaterelated obligations is expected for 20 December 2019 (CLI-number:
ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:887). The case of the Swiss KlimaSeniorinnen
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(Senior Women for Climate Protection) which claimed intergenerational
rights and their violation of the government’s failure in meeting its climate
obligations has been dismissed as having no standing. Currently the case
is on appeal at the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in Lausanne. For more
details, see < https://klimaseniorinnen.ch/english/>. Both are litigations
against states alleging a state’s breach of its domestic and international
legal obligations.

6. Lliuya vs RWE. Case no. 2 O 285/15. Litigation against private entity.

7. 005 petition number P-1413-05; response: 2006 11/16/2006-AA-3276727)

8. The intriguing cases are the ones which attribute responsibility to illegal
harm or violation, for they have to prove a causal and/or probabilistically
plausible chain of reference from action (or inaction) to an illegal effect,
such as violation of property right (Lliuya vs RWE, see endnote viii), of
fundamental constitutional rights of “life, liberty, and property” and of
“reasonable safety, and that of the Posterity”( Juliana, et al. vs USA, et al.,
case no. 18-36082, filed 2015, still ongoing at the US Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeal, for more information, see <https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/
juliana-v-us>) or the Philippine Carbon Major Inquiry that is discussed
here. For an overview of national and international laws and cases, see
the climate litigation databases maintained by Sabin Center for Climate
Change Law at Columbia University <http://climatecasechart.com> and
the LSE Grantham Institute <http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/
climate-change-laws-of-the-world/>.
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